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INTRODUCTION
The Convention on International Trade in EndangeredSpecies (“CITES”) has been relatively ineffective inAfrica as a result of minimal enforcement and compli-
ance.1 As a non-self-enforcing treaty, CITES requires that State
Parties enact domestic legislation to enforce the provisions of
the Convention. Even though non-compliance with CITES is
not unique to the African region,2 there are several factors pecu-
liar to the region that exacerbate the problem of implementation
of these provisions. These problems must be addressed simulta-
neously from geographic, social, political, and economic angles.
Because of the importance of species preservation and the
prominence of international environmental law in modern legal
systems, African countries ought to include CITES provisions in
their domestic laws. To ensure the effectiveness of the
Convention, African countries must domestically enforce all
CITES provisions.
This paper is divided into four parts. Part One provides a
brief overview of CITES and background to the African situa-
tion. Part Two details some of the problems which have imped-
ed the implementation of CITES in Africa. Part Three then dis-
cusses recommendations and proposals to ensure compliance
with CITES in signatory countries of the African region. Part
Four provides a conclusion to this study.
PART ONE: OVERVIEW OF CITES & BACKGROUND
TO THE AFRICAN SITUATION
CITES is an international conservation agreement provid-
ing guidelines for trade3 in endangered species.4 CITES
entered into effect in July 19755 and currently has 152 signato-
ries.6 The Convention7 has been regarded as the Magna Carta8
for wildlife.9
CITES10 was created11 in order to protect12 endangered
species from extinction.13 To achieve this aim, CITES catego-
rizes species into three appendices14 indicating the actual num-
bers of a species and how trade affects the species.15Different
levels of protection are accorded to each Appendix.16 Appendix
1 species are those “threatened with extinction which are or may
be affected by trade.”17 As a result, trade in Appendix 1 species
is only authorized in exceptional circumstances. Appendix 2
species are those that are not immediately threatened with
extinction, but may become so unless trade is restricted.18
Therefore, trade in species listed in Appendix 2 is subject to
restrictions in order to prevent utilization that is “incompatible
with their survival.”19 Species protected under Appendix 3 are
species that require regulation.20 These species are not immedi-
ately threatened with extinction, but still require regulation in
order to prevent exploitation.21 Trade in species categorized
under the three appendices is restricted unless it is in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention.22
Because CITES is a non-self-executing treaty, a State party
must usually adopt legislative or other measures to implement
the Convention.23 Since 1992,24 the laws of 136 countries have
been reviewed under the National Legislation Project (“NLP”),
a system for reviewing and evaluating domestic measures to
implement CITES.25 In determining the level of compliance, the
NLP looks at four criteria:26 (1) whether there has been legisla-
tive designation of authorities responsible for implementing the
Convention;27 (2) whether legislation addresses all species list-
ed in the Convention;28 (3) whether domestic legislation
expressly prohibits illegal trade and designates specific depart-
ments and agents responsible for enforcing the Convention;29
and (4) whether domestic legislation facilitates30 the confisca-
tion or return of species that are illegally traded.31
After this assessment is made, countries are classified into
one of three categories. Countries accorded Category 1 status
are those that have adequately implemented all necessary legis-
lation to ensure compliance with CITES. Category 2 countries
are those that have implemented some legislation, but need
more to meet the legislative requirements.32 Category 3 coun-
tries are those that have not met the requirements of CITES.
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Despite the various categorizations, the effectiveness of
CITES does not depend on whether countries have enacted the
necessary legislation, but on whether the legislation is being
enforced. Nevertheless, attaining Category 1 status is an impor-
tant first step in the quest for compliance and effectiveness.33
The African Situation
The success of CITES is often determined by the number of
animals listed in the appendices, the number of member coun-
tries in a region, the number of proposals submitted, and the
number of permits issued.34 If these were the only determinants
of compliance with CITES in Africa, then implementation of
CITES could be considered a resounding success. In fact, 49 out
of 52 African countries are State Parties to CITES, comprising
32% of the Convention’s signatories. 
However, the seminal indicator of whether the treaty is
effective is not accession or ratification alone, but rather the
implementation and enforcement of the treaty provisions within
a country.35 The dual process of implementation and enforce-
ment must not be decoupled. To do so would render the treaty
ineffective. In reality, implementation without subsequent
enforcement has the same effect as no implementation at all. The
key to enforcement is in actual ‘on-the-ground’ compliance.
Therefore, the success of CITES should not be determined by the
number of State parties to the Convention, but by the actual com-
pliance with its provisions. In this respect, many African coun-
tries have failed to fully implement the CITES provisions into
domestic legislation and enforce those provisions enacted.36
Of the 49 African countries that are signatories to CITES,
only five countries are classified as Category 1 countries.37
Because African countries have the largest species populations
in the world (for example, 40% of the 4,800 plant species locat-
ed in the deserts of South Africa can be found nowhere else in
the world), it is of critical importance to take note of these trends
and to discern ways in which the problem may be addressed. 
Twenty countries, or 41%, have been accorded Category 2
status countries.38 Even though limited implementation by these
countries is better than no implementation at all, the effective-
ness of the Convention is greatly undermined by such minimal
compliance. For the Convention to be effective, there must be
full implementation of the necessary legislation coupled with
compliance.
The majority of African countries fall under the Category 3
rubric. These twenty-four countries, or 45%, need to strengthen
their initiatives to ensure full compliance with the Convention.
Considering that the vast majority of the countries in this cate-
gory ratified the Convention more than fifteen years ago,39 it
seems that there are fundamental problems that may need to be
addressed. In fact, this trend may be indicative of the existence
of collective problems that are impeding the implementation of
the CITES in Africa.
FAILED INITIATIVES
Recognizing the inherent weaknesses of CITES, African
States have resorted to several other initiatives designed prima-
rily to strengthen compliance with CITES.
The Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (“MIKE”)
system is one such initiative.40 The basic premise of the MIKE
system is to monitor illegal elephant hunting and determine the
impact of such hunting on elephant species. This system entails
data collection at designated sites in selected African and Asian
States, including a collection of elephant population data,41
reporting of illegal hunting, and deployment of law enforcement
officers to detect illegal hunting and trade.42
One of the major shortcomings of the MIKE system,
though, is that it does not provide a mechanism to ensure actual
compliance with CITES. It only provides data on elephant
species. Furthermore, the complexity of the system requires
huge amounts of funding for it to be successful. Recognizing
that the elephant is only one of several species listed in CITES
appendices, it is very difficult to justify expending such large
amounts of funds on one species.43
The 1994 Lusaka Agreement is another initiative that has
impacted CITES.44 This Agreement entered into force in 1996,
and provided for the development of wildlife law enforcement
officers recruited from National Bureaus.45 These officers were
a part of the Lusaka Agreement Task Force (“LATF”), which was
primarily responsible for conducting cross-border investigations
into wildlife trade at the requests of the National Bureaus. The
LATF’s mandate was very wide, permitting them to take part in
undercover operations and move freely between States without
visas and entry restrictions, subject to the consent of Parties. 
The Lusaka Agreement signaled a positive step by African
nations to curtail illegal trade, but it was not successful.
Although it was open to accession by all African States, only six
have acceded.46 Issues of sovereignty were of great concern to
State Parties. Furthermore, as with most agreements in Africa,
the Lusaka Agreement had severe funding problems. To date, all
these factors have severely crippled the effectiveness of the
Lusaka Agreement.
Subsequently, the South African Development
Community47 developed a protocol on wildlife conservation
and law enforcement. This protocol basically prescribes an
alternative for wildlife law enforcement.48 The Protocol does
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away with the issue of cross-border policing, replacing that sys-
tem with Interpol. 
A problem with African countries’ implementation of
CITES is that they have developed several systems geared
towards the same aim. In so doing, they spread their finances
and human resources too thin and become jacks-of-all-trades
but masters at none. African States ought to focus on the devel-
opment of one regime and place all efforts into that system.
There is no benefit in developing several systems and having a
half-hearted reception to each of them.
PART TWO: REASONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
The geographic, political, economic and social structures of
African countries have contributed to impeding the implemen-
tation of CITES in countries’ domestic legislation.49 In fact,
implementation and enforcement of CITES in Africa has been
complicated by several factors. Some of these factors include:
corruption, the Precautionary Principle, the flexibility of the
Convention, lack of financial and human resources, inconsisten-
cy between countries in implementing regimes, and in some
cases a lack of political will, wars, and internal conflict.50
CORRUPTION
A major impediment to the compliance and subsequent
effectiveness of CITES is the issue of corruption.51 The 2003
Global Corruption Report cites several African countries as hav-
ing serious problems of corruption.52 The report highlights cor-
ruption in various sectors. However, the aspect of greatest inter-
est to this study and the issue of CITES is the corruption in gov-
ernmental institutions. Regrettably, the institutions designated
with the authority to ensure compliance with CITES are often
those that have the highest levels of corruption. In Burkina Faso,
for instance, a corruption survey indicated that the police are the
most corrupt institution in the country. In Senegal, the traffic
police, customs officials, and police were identified as the most
corrupt institutions. In Benin, the situation is exacerbated by the
fact that transit agents help importers avoid controls in transport-
ing illegal goods.53 It is not unrealistic to expect that the CITES
regime cannot function effectively if the very institutions which
are to guarantee its effectiveness are themselves in disrepute.
Interestingly enough, only Nigeria, which was cited as hav-
ing a corrupt governmental institution, has been accorded
Category 1 status under CITES. All other countries plagued with
serious corruption problems have not been accorded such status
under CITES. For example, Mali, which has a serious problem
with the mismanagement of public funds as well as an ineffec-
tual judicial system, has received a Category 2 classification. In
Mozambique, where corruption is extremely rife, one of the
most corrupt agencies is the port system. Mozambique falls
within the Category 3 classification.
The pattern of corruption seems to be linked with the many
armed conflicts in the region. Conflict tends to provide oppor-
tunities for illicit access to natural resources. Such is the case in
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (“Congo”). It is interesting to
note that Rwanda, Somalia and Burundi, where there have been
long-standing wars, have nevertheless all been accorded
Category 3 status.
An inextricable link appears to exist between the endemic
corruption in Africa and the ability to comply with CITES. The
greater the corruption, the lower the compliance categorization.
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The Precautionary Principle is a very contentious princi-
ple54 in international law, because States implement and inter-
pret it differently.55 The basic premise of the Precautionary
Principle is that in the absence of scientific evidence as to the
effect of a particular substance or activity, the protection of the
environment should be the primary concern.56 Essentially, the
Precautionary Principle recognizes that scientific certainty may
often come too late to prevent environmental harm.57 In this
regard, the Precautionary Principle provides a mechanism
whereby an environmental harm can be prevented and unneces-
sary expenditure avoided.
Although slightly different definitions have been used to
explain the Precautionary Principle, the 1992 Rio Declaration
definition is most widely accepted. The Declaration provides that
“in order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible harm, lack of sci-
entific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”58
The problem which developing countries have with the
Precautionary Principle is that it can be evoked to include addi-
tional species in the CITES appendices. Developing countries
have resisted the application of this principle, because its appli-
cation will mean that they must be more diligent in the preser-
vation of wildlife.59 In some instances, these countries have
taken the stance that the imposition of this principle is premised
on western ideologies, which fail to consider the peculiar situa-
tion of developing nations.
FLEXIBILITY
The inherent flexibility of CITES has contributed to the
problem of non-compliance.60 The flexibility of the Convention
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manifests itself in several ways. For instance, CITES allows
parties to opt out of decisions pertaining to species listings. As
a result, the State Party is in no way bound by a new provi-
sion.61 Still, it must be kept in mind that this same mechanism
is essential to “keeping all the players in the cooperative process
and allowing the regime to bend62 rather than break.”63In addi-
tion to the opt-out mechanism, CITES provisions themselves
are quite flexible. For example, Article VIII, which deals with
measures that the parties may impose to enforce the provisions
of the Convention, has been interpreted to facilitate the exemp-
tion of ranching for trade in listed species. In reality, this type of
interpretative flexibility often results in a trade-off, whereby
provisions are interpreted liberally in their application, but there
is subsequently a stricter listing of species.64
A necessary corollary to the flexibility of the Convention is
the down-listing of species.65 In some instances, State Parties
argue that the down-listing of a species will influence the preser-
vation of the species. 66 For example, at a Convention held in
Harare, Southern African67 countries argued that down-listing of
ivory allowed them to sell their stockpiles of ivory.68 They stated,
in turn, that the revenue generated from such a sale69 would be
used toward elephant conservation and community development
programs. Therefore, they argued, controlled trade of ivory would
benefit the preservation of elephants. Although this argument may
seem untenable, as it is difficult to understand how depletion of a
species may result in its replenishment, one must look at the
efforts of African nations to raise such arguments in circum-
stances where elephant populations are constantly expanding and
wreaking havoc (i.e. by trampling crops of peasant farmers).
Often, these animals may appear to be more of a nuisance than an
asset. Thus, using the species for immediate economic gain as
well as domestic consumption70 seems more viable.71
THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Even though CITES came into force decades ago, several
of the provisions of the Convention remain very contentious.
Such provisions result in non-compliance and the ineffective-
ness of the Convention. For example, Article III(2)(d) provides
that the importing State must grant an import permit before
Appendix 1 species may be traded. The problem with the lan-
guage of the provision is that it takes power to control a species
away from the exporting country, putting control in the hands of
the potential importer. Thus, the importer’s assessment of the
biological status of the species carries more weight than that of
the exporting State.
Article III(3)(c) has also raised concern. This provision
states that trade in Appendix 1 species must not be primarily for
commercial purposes. Although the intention of the drafters to
completely restrict trade in order to preserve the species is a
good one, this provision does not consider circumstances where
commercial trade may benefit the species and even contribute to
its preservation. 
Finally, Article XIV facilitates the adoption of domestic
measures that are stricter than those of the Convention. Although
the original intent was to encourage exporting States to strength-
en their domestic measures, the provision has often been used by
importing nations to curtail trade.72
LACK OF FINANCIAL AND
HUMAN RESOURCES
In several instances, African
countries have reported that their
inability to comply with the provi-
sions has not been because of a lack of
interest, but rather because of a criti-
cal lack of finances. This is clearly
problematic, as the entire CITES sys-
tem is premised on the availability of
funds.73 For example, the basic struc-
ture of the regime mandates the cre-
ation of a domestic authority to over-
see provisions as well as a support system, both of which require
adequate funding. Without these structures, the police, customs,
other law enforcement agencies, and the populace at large do
not have any guaranteed assistance in achieving the provisions
of the Convention.
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that in most
countries, there are no trained personnel to carry out the provi-
sions of the Convention.74 For example, customs officials are
often untrained about which species are categorized under the
three appendices and what trade is allowed or restricted under
the Convention. Since personnel are untrained, enforcement
capacity is weak. Because enforcement capacity is weak, it is no
surprise that illicit trade goes unreported. Several countries have
noted that they have neither the resources nor the capacity to
comply with these provisions.
In order to resolve the issue of lack of funding, some coun-
tries have utilized trade in endangered species as a way of earn-
ing money.75 Such trade in endangered species76 is considered
to be very lucrative.77 In some instances, trade78 has flour-
ished79 under CITES. For example, it is estimated that in 1998,
Zimbabwe sold about 82.8 tons of elephant hides.80 In 1997,
Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe earned an estimated $5 mil-
lion from ivory sales.81
Even though it appears that there are short term gains in
trading endangered species, the costs to countries that may have
to invest more funds in anti-poaching strategies, is far greater in
the long run.
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LACK OF POLITICAL WILL
Several African countries have suffered from grave politi-
cal problems.82 In some instances, government instability cou-
pled with the problems of periodic coup d’états and impending
civil wars all make compliance with CITES seem unimportant.
For example, in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia,83 it is difficult to see
how species preservation could ever be addressed in circum-
stances where the impending war84 continues to claim human
lives.85 As a result, governments are more concerned with
preservation of human life than with species preservation.86
Another political problem in many countries is that legisla-
tion is often inconsistent, so trade in endangered species is
addressed in a fragmented way. For example, there are glaring
inconsistencies in permit procedures, sanction provisions, legal
definitions and the conservation status of indigenous species. This
exacerbates the problem of ensuring compliance, especially since
authorities must also battle budgetary and capacity constraints.87
SOCIAL PROBLEMS
Many countries in the African region are faced with
unprecedented development and population pressures. In fact,
most countries in the Sub-Saharan region expect their popula-
tions to double within the next couple decades. Thus, it becomes
difficult to balance the management of population growth of
both humans and plant or animal species.
PART THREE: RECOMMENDATIONS AND
PROPOSALS
To ensure compliance with CITES, it is imperative that State
Parties address the fundamental problems that have impeded the
adequate implementation of the Convention into their domestic
legislation. The international community must realize that the
answer to implementation does not lie in accession to the
Convention alone. It also lies in the implementation of infra-
structure support systems. To this end, it is suggested that the fol-
lowing measures, where applicable, be invoked to guarantee not
only full compliance with CITES, but also to ensure species
preservation. The guiding principle of any measure that is imple-
mented must be the ability to comply with such a measure.
FLEXIBILITY OF THE CONVENTION
Even though the flexibility of the Convention has contributed
to non-compliance, no amendments should be made.88 One of the
main arguments often used to support amendments is that the pro-
visions of the Convention are outdated. However, the basic struc-
ture and framework of the Convention is still a strong one, and for
that reason alone, an amendment is not suggested. Perhaps a more
tenable position may be to develop new approaches to species
preservation within the existing framework.89
LACK OF FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES
The issue of lack of financial resources can be addressed by
utilizing the natural resources present in a country as a way of
generating income and earning well-needed foreign exchange.
For instance, countries could follow in the footsteps of Kenya
and Namibia by promoting eco-tourism. In Kenya, tourism90 is
recorded as being the country’s largest foreign exchange earner.
Through tourism, governments can inform their local popula-
tions that economic gains can only be achieved by preservation
of endangered species, rather than by killing off species. 
Income might also be generated through taxation in the
context of endangered species. Companies responsible for
depleting plant and animal resources in endangered species
should be taxed accordingly. In Ghana, environmental taxation
exists whereby companies that pollute or deplete the environ-
ment, such as mining, bauxite, and timber companies, are direct-
ly taxed. Additionally, there is indirect taxation, where compa-
nies must replant trees felled during their operations or build
community facilities such as hospitals, clinics, and markets for
the local communities. 
To address the lack of human resources, governments ought
to encourage NGO participation in their initiatives.91 Many
NGOs have professionals well-versed in relevant environmental
issues who can play an important role in disseminating infor-
mation. Basically, governments must enhance cooperation with
NGOs and other major groups needed to work as social partners
for sustainable development.
Also, governments may sponsor regional and sub-regional
workshops that aim to share information about best manage-
ment practices,92 develop national legislation and regulations,
train customs officials, police the enforcement methods of gov-
ernment entities and civil society groups (for example, the
Green Advocates in Liberia93), and also utilize training pro-
grams through organizations such as the International Network
for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (“INECE”).94
LACK OF POLITICAL WILL
Many African countries are now attempting to address
some of the root causes of environmental degradation through
initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s
“The issue of lack of financial resources can be
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Development (“NEPAD”).95 The NEPAD emphasizes good
governance with reference to environmental obligations.
Although not yet in force, the NEPAD96 proposes to deal with
the issue of the environment under eight different priority areas:
(1) desertification; (2) wetland conservation; (3) invasive alien
species; (4) coastal management; (5) global warming; (6) cross-
border partnerships; (7) environmental governance; and (8)
finance from different angles. 
However, markedly absent from NEPAD is any reference to
preservation of endangered species. While this issue may be
covered under “wetland conservation” or perhaps “cross-border
partnerships”, the wording of the provisions do not place suffi-
cient emphasis on endangered species. Therefore, endangered
species preservation ought to be included as the ninth area of
priority intervention in the region. Indeed, African leaders can
show true quality of leadership by promoting mandates that sup-
port environmental sustainability in all its various facets.97
Monitoring institutions must also be developed. In fact, it is
well documented that environmental agreements work best
when they are supported by a strong monitoring component.98
There are clear examples of the effectiveness of CITES when
supported by governmental initiatives.99 For example, South
Africa and Zimbabwe conduct culling programs aimed at main-
taining their elephant populations at a level100 the available
habitat can support.101 By far the greatest threat to elephant
populations is poaching.102 As a result, on June 30 1989, when
Tanzania banned elephant103 hunting by its citizens, the gov-
ernment made it clear that illegal trade activities would not be
tolerated. This contributed significantly to curtailing the trade in
elephants. For successful enforcement of CITES, one of the first
measures is for governments to take a strong stance against illic-
it trade in endangered species. 
Social Problems
It is necessary that education be placed at the forefront of
any CITES initiative. This includes education of enforcement
agents, but also of local populations. This will inevitably be an
essential component of the process of curtailing illicit trade.
Another social measure that could be used is the imposition
of criminal sanctions to enforce trade issues. In Kenya, for
example, the imposition of criminal sanctions led to a marked
decrease in illicit trade and an increased number of persons
arrested for violations of the Convention. Also, arrests and
indictment for illicit trade will act as a deterrent to smugglers. It
is only when the illegal trade is sanctioned104 that States can
ensure high levels of compliance. In so doing, governments will
be sending a clear signal to violators that they are serious about
controlling the trade in endangered species.105
Another way in which State Parties can ensure compliance
with CITES is by reviewing current legislation on environment
and development to ensure that it addresses present day reali-
ties.106 National conservation legislation should incorporate cre-
ative tools and strategies in achieving sustainable legal wildlife
trade107 (for instance, through the use of incentives and the
involvement of communities in biodiversity management).108
Finally, an effective way of dealing with non-compliance
might be the use of trade sanctions.109 Since 1985, three African
countries have been subject to these sanctions. In 2001, Congo
was under scrutiny for alleged permit fraud. Rebels were discov-
ered to have issued false CITES documents, which were then
used to transport chimpanzees across borders. The chimpanzees
were listed on Appendix 2, and as a result, were not to be traded.
Congo has not yet complied. However, the other two cases have
been successful. In Equatorial Guinea, even though it was not a
member of CITES, the Secretariat urged Parties to the
Convention to ban all trade in CITES species with the country in
1988. In 1992, Equatorial Guinea acceded to the Convention and
the ban was subsequently lifted.110 In 1999, Senegal was also
subjected to a trade sanction. In 2000, this too was lifted. 
PART FOUR: CONCLUSION
Even though many countries have acceded to the
Convention, implementation of the CITES provisions in the
domestic legislation of countries in the African region is lack-
ing. Even though this treaty was ratified by some of these coun-
tries more than twenty years ago, governments today still
require assistance in the implementation of the provisions of the
Convention. These countries’ accession to the Convention may
seem progressive, but upon closer examination, the converse is
true. Even where domestic legislation is in place, there may not
necessarily be compliance and enforcement.
This study is in no way conclusive. Some of the many issues
that still need to be addressed are: (1) what laws have been put in
place in Category 1 countries in Africa; (2) the types of enforce-
ment mechanisms utilized in countries; (3) the effectiveness of
the enforcement mechanisms; (4) whether legal strategies, such as
taxation, can be deployed to assist with a more effective imple-
mentation of the CITES Convention; and (5) what mechanisms
ought to be used to monitor the effectiveness of CITES. 
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